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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the effects of taxes and policy instruments that aim to regulate 
climate services from forests. It consists of a summary section and four articles. Articles (I) 
and (II) examine the effects of taxes on management decisions in the context of managed 
boreal forests distinguished by forest-owners’ amenity preferences and also their age. 
Articles (III) and (IV) examine the role of carbon-based policy instruments in the presence 
of taxes on land incomes in curbing tropical deforestation.  
Article (I) reveals that the intensity of forest-owners’ preferences for forest amenities 
affects the non-neutrality of forest taxes pertaining to forest harvesting. Therefore, the 
effects of taxes depend on this intensity. This highlights the importance of developing 
methods to measure forest-owners’ amenity preferences quantitatively. Article (II) shows 
that the age of forest-owners governs their propensity to consume as opposed to leave 
bequests. Furthermore, it shown that the effects of capital income and inheritance taxes 
vary across different age-groups of forest-owners. Article (III) demonstrates that taxes on 
forestry and cash-crop incomes, per se, may be ineffective in curbing tropical forest loss. 
The carbon payments may complement these taxes, and an effective policy to combat 
tropical deforestation should jointly target forestry and cash-crop sectors. Article (IV) 
demonstrates the link between carbon compensation policies and land income taxation. An 
optimal carbon compensation scheme may require that national governments are allowed to 
use different compensation rates from that applied globally when passing national level 
compensations on to the local level. These results suggest that existing policies such as 
taxation should be accounted for in the analysis and design of international carbon policy 
instruments that aim at enhancing forests’ role in climate change mitigation. 
 
Keywords: Ageing, amenity preference, carbon payments, nonindustrial private forests, 
taxes, tropical deforestation  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and motivation of the thesis 
In perfect market conditions, taxes are used to collect public revenue, in which case their 
desired property is neutrality. Under market imperfections, they can be used to increase 
economic efficiency by correcting market failures. Taxes imposed in the forest sector, 
similar to those in other sectors, are an important public policy instruments and source of 
government revenue for public spending. Such taxes form the largest cost category for the 
private forest-owners in many parts of the world and thus may play a vital role in their 
forest harvesting and other economic decisionmaking. 
The amenity services of forests such as carbon sequestration, scenic beauty, 
biodiversity and wilderness also affect decisionmaking of private forest-owners (e.g. Calish 
et al. 1978; Ovaskainen 1992; Kuuluvainen et al. 1996; Koskela and Ollikainen 1997) as 
demand for these services is increasing. Moreover, these services are being appreciated 
more by the private sector. Likewise, the age-distribution of forest-owners has effects on 
their harvesting and other decisionmaking, and determines timber stocking in their forests 
(Favada et al. 2007).  Consequently, the amenity preferences and age of the forest-owners 
affect their objectives (e.g. Kuuluvainen et al. 1996; Favada et al. 2009), and also the 
effectiveness of forest taxation policies. Therefore, theoretical analysis of forest taxation 
that ignores the distribution of forest-owners based on their amenity preference and age 
may give misleading results.  
A large number of forest economics studies dating back to Max and Lehman (1988) 
have examined the non-neutrality of different forest taxes under forest amenity valuation.
1
 
However, amenity preferences in those studies had entered the analysis only qualitatively 
without any measurement of their relative strengths. Therefore, the interlinkages between 
the effects of forest taxes and different forest-owners groups that are separated by the 
intensity of amenity preferences
2
  have hitherto been absent. Moreover, earlier forest 
economics literature has not addressed the question of how the reaction to forest taxation 
varies across different age groups of forest-owners.  
Taxes on income affect the level of forest harvesting, for example, in the presence of 
uncertainties (e.g. Koskela 1989a, 1989b; Ollikainen 1993), amenity valuation (e.g. 
Ovaskainen 1992; Uusivuori and Kuuluvainen 2008) and when a larger economy structure 
is integrated into the analysis (Kovenock 1986). An increase in forest income taxation can 
reduce the removal of forest biomass by limiting forest harvesting, which could contribute 
to increasing the biomass and carbon stock of standing forests. However, the increase in 
taxation could also be associated with a permanent decrease in the profit of timber 
investment and hence could discourage forestry investment itself. This, in turn, could lead 
to reduced biomass and carbon stock of forests in the long run (Wibe and Gong 2010).  
On the other hand, carbon-based policy incentives, such as carbon payments or 
timber-cutting penalties  may result in either keeping a forest standing for longer periods 
(e.g. van Kooten et al. 1995, Hoen and Solberg 1997, Uusivuori and Laturi 2007, 
                                                           
1 A more detailed review of these studies is presented in the literature review section of Chapter 2. 
2 The intensity of amenity preference refers to the relative weight given by the forest-owners to 
amenity services of forests and timber. The relative utility weight of amenity services was 
incorporated in the theoretical models of Kuuluvainen et al. (1996) and Ovaskainen et al. (2006). 
These studies, however, did not discuss forest taxes. 
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Thompson et al. 2009) or lead to reduced thinning harvests (e.g. Pohjola and Valsta 2007). 
However, these are new or still non-existing policy instruments, and their effectiveness in 
enhancing the role of forests in climate change mitigation is yet to be proven. In contrast, 
taxes as policy instruments have been in place for a long time. Therefore, what role taxes 
can play in the presence of policy instruments that aim to regulate climate services from 
forests is an interesting and important question. More specifically, a better knowledge of 
the complementary functions between taxes and carbon-based policy incentives is needed 
to help choose the best policy options that should enhance the role of forests in climate 
change mitigation. 
Previous literature that deals with the role in climate change mitigation of even-aged 
forests –mostly located in boreal and temperate zones– had addressed potential climate 
policy issues separately from forest policy aspects (e.g. Englin and Callaway 1993, van 
Kooten et al. 1995, Keeler 2005). In contrast, a wide array of studies on forest economics 
had assessed the impacts of certain policy measures such as taxes and subsidies on even-
aged forests but without addressing the question of climate change (e.g. Koskela and 
Ollikainen 2001, Ovaskainen et al. 2006, Uusivuori and Kuuluvainen 2008). Similarly, the 
literature on tropical forests had analyzed the climate policy measures such as carbon 
payments to avoid deforestation without considering existing policies such as forestry 
income taxation (e.g. Börner and Wunder 2008, Pfaff et al. 2007). Conversely, the impacts 
of income taxes on the level of tropical forest resources management were examined but 
without addressing the question of climate change (e.g. Namaalwa et al. 2007, Anthon et al. 
2008, Ruzicka 2010, Karsenty 2010). However, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no 
study had investigated the joint impacts of taxes and climate policy instruments that target 
forests. 
 
1.2 Objectives  
The first purpose of this thesis is to analyze how the impacts of forest taxes vary among 
forest-owners who differ by their amenity preferences and by their age. The second purpose 
is to study how taxes could be combined with carbon policy instruments for curbing 
tropical deforestation. This thesis is based on four separate articles the objectives of which 
are given below.  
The objective of article (I) is to investigate the effects of the profit and land value 
taxes
3
 on nonindustrial private forest (NIPF) owners' clear-cutting and thinning decisions 
under amenity preference. More specifically, it examines how the tax effects vary at 
different intensities of forest amenity preferences of the forest-owners. Furthermore, the 
article analyzes a voluntary tax regime in which a lowered profit tax rate could be 
combined with a land value tax as a win-win alternative to a forest tax regime with a profit 
tax but no land value tax.  
The key question in article (II) is what the impacts of the capital income and 
inheritance taxes imposed on forest and non-forest assets
4
 are on NIPF owners' harvesting 
                                                           
3 The profit tax is defined as a proportional tax on the net timber sales income, and the land value tax 
as a lump-sum tax levied on a set value of the forestland. 
4 The tax imposed on timber bequests is called the inheritance tax on timber assets, whereas that 
imposed on non-forest (i.e., external assets) bequests is called the inheritance tax on external assets. 
The capital income tax on forest assets is based on timber sales income net of the replanting cost and 
is therefore equivalent to the proportional profit tax discussed in the forest economics literature. The 
capital income tax on external assets, on the other hand, targets the capital income from monetary 
savings. 
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and consumption behavior under life-time uncertainty. More specifically, this article deals 
with the question of how the impacts of taxes on harvesting and consumption behavior 
change among different age-groups of forest-owners with valued forest amenities.  
The objective of article (III) is to answer the question of how effective the carbon 
payment and taxes on forestry and cash-crop incomes are in combating tropical forest loss 
by analyzing data from the Chaco eco-region of Paraguay. The article also addresses how 
the rate of required carbon payments and land prices change as more privately held tropical 
forests are targeted for conservation.  
 Article (IV) contributes to modeling the economics of tropical deforestation under 
carbon crediting options for standing forests. This article also investigates optimal policies 
in terms of carbon compensation and land income taxation that would ensure a socially 
desired level of tropical forest resources.  
 
1.3 Key contributions of the thesis 
The contributions of the articles of this thesis are related to both the theoretical modeling of 
forest-owner’s behavior and economics of tropical deforestation, and to forest policies and 
policies that regulate climate services from the forest sector. The policy related 
contributions of this thesis are as follows. First, article (I) shows that the profit and land 
value taxes affect only those forest-owners who value both timber production and forest 
amenity benefits. Conversely, these taxes do not affect the decisions of those forest-owners 
who clearly prefer either timber production or amenity benefits. Second, it is shown in 
article (II) that the reactions of forest-owners to capital income and inheritance taxes that 
target forest and non-forest assets vary across different age-groups. Third, article (III) 
demonstrates that taxes, per se, may be ineffective in curbing tropical deforestation, but 
carbon payments could complement taxes. Moreover, it is shown that taxes on forestry 
income have a very minimal impact on the rate of carbon payments needed to bring more 
privately held tropical forest under conservation. Finally, article (IV) shows that a national 
carbon compensation policy to save tropical forests is crucially dependent on pre-existing 
land income taxation.  The taxation may make it optimal for a national government to apply 
different rates of carbon compensation than it received from the international community 
(e.g. in a REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) -type of 
arrangement) in compensating the local carbon service providers such as a community that 
has right to tropical forests.  
The theoretical models used in articles (I) and (II) to illustrate the behavior of forest-
owners are the first applications of the forestland-based modeling approach (Uusivuori and 
Kuuluvainen 2005, 2008) in the two-period framework. In the two-period forestland models 
used in articles (I) and (II), the harvesting decision variable targets forestland area, instead 
of timber volume, as in the two-period biomass harvesting model used in the earlier 
literature. This allows one to account for – within a two-period framework – the value of 
new growth on land cleared in the first period, which can be considered as representing the 
land costs. Moreover, by specifying the forest area as a decision variable, these models can 
explicitly identify the specific harvesting methods and thus are also able to incorporate the 
age-class structure of the forests, which the two-period forestry models used in earlier 
literature had ignored. Another contribution of article (I) is that the two-period forestland 
model used in this article distinguishes harvesting between thinning and clear-cutting. 
Theoretical contributions of article (II) are, first, that it incorporates the impacts of the age 
of forest-owners when analyzing the effects of taxes. Second, it outlines a way to 
circumvent the conceptual question of what happens, at the occurrence of passing away of a 
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forest-owner, to his assets that were not planned to be bequeathed. Such a question is kept 
open in the earlier literature. The model allows for the forest-owner to bequeath all his 
assets that are left at the time of his death, instead of a priori deciding on the exact size of 
bequests. Article (III) applies a market equilibrium framework to tropical deforestation 
problem, which had not been done in the economics literature concerning tropical forests. 
In addition, article (IV) contributes to the economics of deforestation by presenting an 
infinite-horizon dynamic optimization model with carbon crediting option of tropical 
forests. 
The remainder of the summary proceeds as follows. The next chapter reviews the 
models that form the theoretical basis for the separate articles, followed by a review of 
earlier literature.  Chapter 3 presents the methodologies applied and the special features of 
the models used in, and results of separate articles. Discussion and conclusions are 
presented in Chapter 4.  
 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EARLIER LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Theoretical models  
2.1.1 Faustmann rotation model  
The Faustmann rotation model – also known as the optimal forest rotation model – 
determines the optimal time to cut an even-aged forest stand or the optimal forest rotation 
length. In a basic Faustmann rotation model, timber volume (or yield) of an even-aged 
stand is described as the function of the stand age so as to maximize the net present value of 
an infinite chain of successive rotations by choosing the optimal harvesting age. The 
optimality condition of the model suggests cutting the forest when the marginal value 
increment of forest equals the opportunity cost, i.e. the interest on the value of standing 
stock and forest land (see e.g. Samuelson 1976, and Johansson and Löfgren 1985, p.73- 80).  
The classical Faustmann model is based on a set of assumptions as identified by 
Samuelson (1976).  The model assumes that the stumpage prices and future interest rates 
are constant and known, the growth function of stands is known, the markets for forestland 
and financial capital are perfect. Furthermore, the model considers timber as the only output 
of forest and ignores all other non-timber products and services, and each forest stand as a 
completely separate unit free of any influence from neighboring stands. The model has 
been extended to relax these assumptions, by introducing, inter alia, non-timber values, i.e. 
amenity values of forests (e.g. Hartman 1976, Strang 1983, Bowes and Krutilla 1985, Salo 
and Tahvonen 2002a), non-linear harvesting costs (e.g. Heaps 1984), endogenous timber 
prices (e.g. Mitra and Wan 1985, Salo and Tahvonen 2002b, 2003) and imperfect capital 
markets (e.g. Tahvonen et al. 2001).  
2.1.2 Two-period model of a utility maximizing forest-owner 
The earliest case of applying a two-period framework to forestry problems dates back to 
Binkley (1980).  However, the commonly known two-period biomass harvesting forestry 
models are not of the type described in Binkley (1980), rather they are extensions of the 
Fisherian consumption-saving model, and were introduced by Löfgren and Johansson (1982) 
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and Lohmander (1983).  Next, first a basic version of the two-period model of a utility 
maximizing forest-owner who does not value forest amenities is presented closely 
following Kuuluvainen (1990). This basic version with extensions has been extensively 
used in forest economics literature (e.g. Max and Lehman 1988, Koskela 1989a, b, 
Ollikainen 1990, 1991, 1993, 1996, Ovaskainen 1992, Kuuluvainen et al. 1996).  After the 
biomass model, a simplified version of the two-period forestland models used in articles (I) 
and (II) is presented.  This model operates with forestland area and incorporates forest 
amenity preferences by weighing the importance given by the forest-owners to forest 
amenities and timber benefits. 
 
(i) Basic two-period biomass harvesting model 
Assume that the forest-owner maximizes his utility from consumption over two periods (ct, 
ct+1). The utility function is increasing and concave, i.e., 0(.)' >u  and 0(.)'' <u , and is 
additively separable between the time periods. The utility maximization problem of the 
forest-owner can be given as: 
 
)(
1
1
)(max 1++
+= tt cucuU ρ
  (1)  
Subject to 
tttt wwhpc −+= 0     (2) 
( ) tttt wrhpc ++= +++ 1111     (3) 
( ) ( )ttt hQghQh −+−=+1     (4) 
The periodic utility is realized at the beginning of each period. The utility in the 
second period is discounted at the rate of forest-owner’s subjective time preference ρ, 
which is strictly positive. At the beginning of the first period t, the ownership consists of a 
total standing timber stock of Q cubic meter, m
3 
and a financial asset of w0. The decisions 
the forest-owner faces at the beginning of period t are how much of the standing stock to 
harvest, denoted by ht ( Qht ≤≤0 ) and how much money to save, denoted by wt (saving if 
0>tw , borrowing if 0<tw ). This implies that the harvesting parameter, ht, targets the 
forest biomass or timber volume. The model ignores the age-class structure of the forests. 
The consumption of the forest-owner in the current period, as given by (2), originates 
from the timber selling revenue, tthp , where pt is the timber price net of harvesting costs in 
period t, and changes of financial assets ( )tww −0 . The planning horizon of the forest-owner 
ends in the second period, t+1, and thus his consumption constraint (3) consists of the value 
of the second period timber stock and of the principal and interest on savings made in the 
first period, ( ) twr+1 .
5 
Here pt+1 is the timber price net of harvesting costs in period t+1 and 
r is the market interest rate. Equations (2) and (3) give the periodic budget constraints of the 
forest-owner. The timber stock harvested in period t+1, as given by (4), contains the stock 
not harvested in period t, i.e. ( )thQ −  and growth on that stock over one period, i.e. 
                                                           
5 In the basic model the forest-owner does not have any bequest motive. 
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( )thQg − . The growth function is concave on the standing timber stock after the first period 
harvesting i.e. 0'>g for ( ) MSYt QhQ <−<0 , 0'<g for ( ) MSYt QhQ ≥− , and 0'' <g , where 
MSYQ  is the timber volume at maximum sustained yield.  
The optimal consumption rule of the forest-owner is derived by substituting (2 – 4) 
into (1) and taking the derivative with respect to (w.r.t.) the net saving, wt: 
( )
( ) ρ+
+
=
+ 1
1
'
'
1
r
cu
cu
t
t    (5) 
The rule (5) implies that when the subjective time preference rate of the forest-owner 
equals the market interest rate, then his marginal utilities of consumption in both periods 
and also the periodic consumption levels are equal. It can further be seen from (5): 
 
if ρ<r , 1+> tt cc  and if ρ>r , 1+< tt cc   (6) 
 
Condition (6) implies that when the subjective time preference rate of the forest-owner 
is higher than the market interest rate, then current consumption, ct, is larger than future 
consumption, ct+1, and the opposite holds when the market interest rate is higher than the 
time preference rate. Assuming an interior solution, the optimal harvesting rule of the 
forest-owner can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( ) 1'11 ++=+ tt pgrp     (7) 
 
where 'g  is the growth rate of forest biomass.  
The left hand side (LHS) of (7) represents the marginal benefit of current harvesting 
and the right hand side (RHS) the marginal cost of it. The marginal benefit is the revenue 
from harvesting one m
3
 more timber in period t, and the marginal cost is the revenue to be 
earned from harvesting that one more m
3
 of timber in the following period, t+1. It can be 
noted that the marginal utility terms are absent in (7), which implies that the harvesting and 
consumption decisions are separable from each other. 
 
(ii) Two-period forestland model with forest amenity valuation 
Next, a simplified version of the model used in articles (I) and (II) of this thesis is 
presented. In the model, the harvesting decision is specified for the forestland area where 
timber is cut down, rather than the timber volume as in the basic version described earlier. 
Furthermore, an amenity sub-utility function is included.  The utility maximization problem 
of the forest-owner under a perfect capital market is given as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )





+
++





+
+−= ++ 11
1
1
)(
1
1
)(1max tttt QAQAcucuU ρ
α
ρ
α  (8) 
Subject to 
( ) titt wwaxkqpc −+−=    (9)  
( )[ ] ( ) tittt wrxkaqpaqpc ++−−+= ++++ 1111111   (10) 
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( ) iii qfq '11 +=+    (11) 
xqQ it =     (12) 
xqaaxqQ it 111 )1( ++ −+= .   (13) 
 
where the amenity utility function is also assumed to be strictly concave, i.e., 0(.)' >A  
and 0(.)'' <A . Harvesting in the first period increases utility from consumption of goods and 
services, but decreases utility from forest amenities in the second period by reducing the 
standing stock. This makes timber production and consumption decision nonseparable. In 
(8) α ( 10 ≤≤ α ) refers to the amenity preference that measures the relative weight given by 
the forest-owner to amenity and consumption utilities. The larger the value of α, the more 
emphasis is laid by the owner on the forest amenities. It can be noted that the amenity 
utility part in the above maximization problem (8 –13) is specified in such a way that the 
loss of amenity utility in the first period is experienced only in the second period.  
At the beginning of the current period t, the forest-owner owns a financial asset, w , 
and  x hectares of forestland with i period old stands that contains qi cubic meters of timber 
per hectare. In contrast to the basic version of the two-period biomass harvesting model 
presented in the earlier section, at the beginning of period t the forest-owner decides to 
harvest a share a (0 ≤ a ≤ 1) of his forestland and save wt amount of money (saving if wt > 0, 
borrowing if wt < 0). Using this formulation the model can be generalized to an infinite-
time horizon model with any number of age classes and be applied to study the standard 
Faustmann rotation problem (Uusivuori and Kuuluvainen 2005). This is not the case with 
the biomass harvesting model. The harvesting share is given as a percentage of the 
forestland and hence targets the hectares of forestland. This implies that the harvesting 
method followed is clear-cutting.
6
 The model being described in this section and the models 
used in articles (I) and (II) are the first applications of a forestland-based modeling 
approach in two-period framework.  
In period t, the forest-owner clear-cuts ax hectares to earn a harvesting income of 
( )axkqp it −  and leaves (1-a)x hectares for the next period, t+1, where pt is the timber price 
per m
3
 in period t. He replants the harvested area at a cost of k per ha (assuming that 
kqp it > ). Therefore, the first period consumption of the forest-owner consists of timber 
harvesting income net of the replanting cost and a net saving (9). 
The consumption in period t+1 consists of timber harvesting income and the principal 
and interest of the savings made in period t, i.e., (1+r)wt, where r is the market interest rate 
(10). The timber harvesting income comes from the clear-cutting of old-growth forest, 
pt+1qi+1(1-a) and the new-growth forest, pt+1q1a, where pt+1 is the timber price per cubic 
meter in period t+1. Replanting costs of k per ha are assumed for both types of forests.
7
 The 
old growth consists of stands that grow on a site not harvested in the current period and 
hence are i+1 periods old in the next period, and have qi+1 cubic meters of timber per 
hectare. On the other hand, the new growth stands grow on a site harvested in the current 
period and hence are just one period old in the subsequent period, and contain q1 cubic 
meters of timber per hectare assuming that qi+1 > q1. When the forest-owner decides 
                                                           
6 In article (I) of this thesis an extension is made where the model features both clear-cutting and 
thinning. 
7 It can be assumed that at the end of the second period, another two-period cycle starts and the cycle 
is repeated over time. This implies the land remains in forestry use and is replanted after every clear-
cutting.  
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whether or not to harvest in the current period, his opportunity cost of not harvesting also 
includes the income from the land to be freed by harvesting. Therefore, the value of new 
growth, pt+1q1a, is an opportunity cost of not harvesting the forest in the current period. The 
growth of forest from one period to another is linear with a constant rate of growth 'if  
( 0'',0' => ii ff ), a rate given as a constant percentage of per ha volume of forest from the 
current to the next period.  Here sub-script i indicates that the growth rate is connected to 
the age of forest. 
The optimal consumption rule in this model is the same as in the basic version given 
by (5). However, assuming an interior solution, the optimal harvesting rule is different and 
can be given as:  
 
( )( ) ( )
( )
( )11
1
1
1111
'
'
1
1 qq
cu
QA
qpqprkqp i
t
t
ittit −−
+=++− +
+
+
+++ α
α
 (14) 
 
In (14), the LHS is the marginal benefit and the RHS is the marginal cost of forest 
harvesting in period t. The first term on the marginal-benefit side is the revenue net of the 
replanting cost from harvesting, i.e. clear-cutting one ha of i period old forest in period t, 
whereas the second term is the revenue from clear-cutting one ha of new-growth forest in 
period t+1. The second term indicates that the new growth forest is the opportunity cost 
(opportunity benefit) of not clear-cutting (clear-cutting) forest in period t. The first term on 
the RHS of (14) is the revenue from harvesting one ha of forest in period t+1, and the 
second term,
( )
( )1
1
'
'
1 +
+
− t
t
cu
QA
α
α
 can be interpreted as the relative marginal amenity utility to the 
forest-owner. Because the marginal amenity utility term is affected by the consumption 
level, the presence of this term in the harvesting decision rule implies that the harvesting 
decision of the forest-owner is not separable from his consumption decision. This term adds 
up to the marginal cost of current harvesting, which implies that the marginal cost of 
current harvesting is larger when the amenity valuation is considered than when it is 
ignored. This indicates that the amenity valuation of the forest owner works toward 
decreasing the current harvesting. This can formally be shown using (14). Since 
( ) 0.'(.),' >Au as per assumption, for any non-zero amenity preference the relative marginal 
utility term is positive. Therefore, for 0>α and ( ) 0.' >A : 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )kqp
qqp
rqqprkqp
it
it
itit −
−
>+⇒−>+− ++++
111
111 11  (15) 
 
This rule suggests that the marginal rate of return on the growing stock is smaller than 
the market rate of interest when forest amenities are present. This, in turn, implies that the 
optimal growing stock remains greater. Therefore, a smaller amount of timber is harvested 
in the first period to leave a larger forest resource for the second period. Consequently, the 
amenity valuation of the forest owner decreases the current harvesting.   
 
2.1.3 Dynamic optimization model for tropical deforestation 
In the literature, various types of models that explain the economics of deforestation are 
extensively used.
 
Walker and Smith (1993) and Mateo (1997) respectively used optimal 
stopping and optimal control models to analyze the tropical-forest clearing policy of a 
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private agent. Bulte and van Soest (1996) applied a dynamic modeling approach and 
demonstrated that encroachment by shifting cultivators may save virgin tropical forests 
from being cleared by concessionaires. Furthermore, analyses using dynamic models 
showed that tropical deforestation decreases as the property rights become more secure 
(Mendelsohn 1994, Amacher et al. 2009) and non-timber benefits from forests increase 
(Amacher et al. 2009). However, tropical deforestation increases with greater corruption 
and dependency of local people on forests (Barbier et al. 2005), and rising agricultural 
prices and profit from marketing timber (Hartwick et al. 2001).
8
  An infinite horizon 
dynamic optimization model that explains the economics of tropical deforestation is 
presented below. This model is a simplified version of the model used in article (IV) and 
also features the core concept of the model used in article (III). 
Assume that in the beginning of a period { }∞++∈ ..,.........2,1, 000 tttt , the agent, who 
could be a private individual, firm or indigenous community, owns tx  ha of tropical forest 
with a timber stock of q m
3
ha
-1
.  The agent maximizes his utility over an infinite time 
horizon by choosing the optimal rate of forest clearing in each period. Utility is derived 
from both monetary value of consumption (ct) and the amenity services originated from the 
standing forest stock (Qt). Both the consumption (.)'u  and amenity ( ).'A  utilities are 
increasing and concave functions of their respective arguments, i.e.
 
( ) 0.'(.),' >Au  
and ( ) 0.''(.),'' <Au . The utility function satisfies the Inada conditions, and is additively 
separable between consumption and amenity utilities as well as among time periods. The 
consumption of the agent is limited by a budget constraint in which the present value of 
consumptions in all periods does not exceed his forestland value, (.)
0t
LV  perceived in initial 
period t0 (explained later in this section) and external asset 
0t
w in that period. The agent’s 
expected utility maximization problem at the beginning of period t0 can be given as:  
 
{ }
( )[ ]








+∑=
∞
=
−
∞
=
)(
0
0
0
0
,
tt
tt
tt
tt
ca
QAcuEUMax
tttt
β    (16) 
Subject to 
),,(
000000
0
0
t
tim
tttttt
tt
tt
pxLVwc µδ a+≤∑
∞
=
−   (17) 
tqxaQ ttt ∀−= )1(    (18) 
txax ttt ∀−=+ )1(1    (19) 
 
where, ( ) 11 −+= ρβ  and ( ) 11 −+= rδ , ρ and r are the time discount and market 
interest rates, respectively both of which are strictly positive, and (19) gives the 
forestland area dynamics. Future utilities are considered as expected utilities formed in 
                                                           
8 Static models were also used to explain the economics of  tropical deforestation under competitive 
land-use options, for example, by  Barbier and Burgess (1997), Hardie and Parks (1997), Parks et al. 
(1998), Alix-Garcia (2007), Amacher et al. (2009, p. 166-173) and Angelsen (2010). For 
comprehensive reviews of analytical and other models of tropical deforestation, see also Kaimowitz 
and Angelsen (1998), Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999), Angelsen (1999) and Amacher et al. (2009, p. 
163-165). 
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current period, t0, and 
0t
E is the expectation operator. The forestland value depends on 
current and expected future clearing decisions, i.e., { },....., 1000 += ttt aaa .This is explained 
next. 
The tropical forest stock is assumed to be non-renewable. It can be justified by the 
fact that once the forestland in tropics is cleared, it permanently goes to other uses such 
as agriculture. This fact is reflected in the forestland area dynamics given by (19). The 
agent’s revenue from forest clearing comes from selling timber as well as selling the 
cleared land to other uses. He also receives an income from selling non-timber products 
procured from uncleared forests such as mushrooms, berries and honey. 
9
 Let, timtp  be 
the timber price per m
3
, ltp  the price per ha of cleared forestland and kt the forest-
clearing (e.g. from slash and burn) cost per ha, and tµ  the non-timber income net of any 
procurement cost from each ha of uncleared forest in period t. We assume that only the 
first period timber and cleared land prices, non-timber income and forest clearing costs 
are known, but those in all future periods are uncertain and follow a trend-stationary 
process. Therefore, all future prices, revenues and costs are considered as expectations. 
The land value to the agent in the current period t0 is the present value of expected profit 
flows derived from the forest, and can be given as: 
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 (20) 
On the RHS of (20), the first term gives the profit flow realized in period t0, and 
the second term gives sum of net the expected profit flows generated in all future 
periods as perceived in period t0. The profit flow in each period consists of incomes 
from forest clearing net of clearing costs and non-timber forest products sale. The 
optimal consumption and clearing rules are derived by using the Lagrangian multiplier 
and by solving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions necessary for the optimum. The 
optimal consumption rule can be given as:  
 
tcuE t
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In (21) the Lagrange multiplier λ  gives shadow price of the expected marginal 
utility of consumption in period t. The optimal consumption rule can more generally be 
given as: 
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9  Carbon sequestration and other environmental services such as biodiversity and watershed 
regulations can also be seen as non-timber produce of tropical forests. 
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The above consumption rule can be explained in the same way as the rule in two-
period model given by (5). Assuming an interior solution, the optimal forest clearing 
rule for a period t perceived in t0 can be given as: 
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The left hand side (LHS) of (23) represents the marginal benefits of forest clearing, 
whereas the RHS represents the marginal costs. As the rule suggests, besides the 
amenity services, the current non-timber income and all future incomes are the 
opportunity cost, i.e. marginal cost for current forest clearing. 
The time dimension of the solution regarding consumption (21 and 22) and forest 
clearing (23) has to be understood in the following way. The actions for the current 
period 0tt =  
are performed as the optimality conditions state. For the future periods 
0tt >  the optimality conditions present the expected decisions given by information at 
0tt = . These expected actions induce expected values for the monetary wealth and land 
value. The decision problem is solved in every period as the new realizations for the 
random variables are observed.  
The supply-side model of article (III) is a two-period application of the model 
presented above with the option values that originate from carbon crediting and land 
income taxation incorporated.  In article (IV) the above model is extended to incorporate 
carbon crediting option of tropical forests and land income taxation. 
 
2.2 Literature on taxation and climate policy instruments targeting forests  
2.2.1 Forest taxation under amenity valuations  
The effects of common forest taxes, which most notably include  yield, site productivity 
and ad valorem property taxes on the harvesting behavior of a forest-owner who considers 
amenity values of forest side-by-side timber have been studied in a two-period framework 
by  Max and Lehman (1988), Ovaskainen (1992),  Koskela and Ollikainen (1997), and 
Amacher et al. (1998). 
10
 Moreover, Amacher and Brazee (1997) described a forest-owner’s 
behavior using a two-period model with forest taxes and amenity valuation.  In addition, 
Koskela and Ollikainen (2001, 2003) used the optimal rotation model, and Uusivuori and 
Kuuluvainen (2008) used the age-class model to study the effects of forest taxes on timber 
harvesting under the amenity valuation. These studies showed that the amenity valuation of 
forest-owners break the neutrality of the common forest taxes concerning forest harvesting. 
However, none of these studies addressed the question of how the effects of forest taxes 
vary at different intensities of amenity valuation by the forest-owners. These studies also 
                                                           
10 For the sake of completeness, the literature that either reviewed earlier forest taxation literature or 
studied forest taxation without considering amenity valuations is presented in Table 1.  
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did not examine forest tax effects within a framework that combines both thinning and 
clear-cutting harvests. These two aspects are investigated in the article (I) of this thesis. 
2.2.2 Taxation and the bequest motive 
The literature on the bequest motive and inheritance taxes on NIPF owner’s decision 
making is scant. The effects of the bequest motive, in the absence of any tax, on forest 
capital stock development were discussed by Löfgren (1991), Hultkrantz (1992) and 
Tahvonen (1998).  Ollikainen (1998) and Amacher et al. (1999) investigated the effects of 
the inheritance and forestry taxes upon NIPF owners’ harvesting and bequeathing 
decisionmaking. Further, Amacher et al. (2002, 2003) studied the effects of an optimal mix 
of bequest and harvest taxes on the bequeathing behavior of private forest-owners. 
However, this literature did not address the question of how the effects of forest and 
bequest taxes vary across different age-groups of forest-owners, which is the aim of article 
(II) of this thesis.  
 
2.2.3 Carbon policy instruments and taxes to regulate climate services from forests 
The effects of policy incentives for carbon sequestration on optimal forest rotation are 
discussed by, for example, Englin and Callaway (1993), Adams et al. (1999), Murry (2000), 
Sohngen and Mendelsohn (2003), Chladná (2007), Sohngen and Brown (2008) and Asante 
et al. (2011). Furthermore, the effect on optimal rotation or timber yield of policy program 
where the forest carbon sequestration by keeping forest standing is subsidized and the 
carbon release by harvesting is taxed is discussed by van Kooten et al. (1995), Hoen and 
Solberg (1997), Pohjola and Valsta (2007), and Thompson et al. (2009). In addition, 
Uusivuori and Laturi (2007), and Guthrie and Kumareswaran (2009) investigated the 
effects of carbon payments on private forest-owners’ decisionmaking. These studies 
focused on even-aged forests. 
There are a handful of studies analyzing the impacts of carbon-based policy 
instruments that target forests in the tropics. Hunt (2008) discussed the role of carbon 
incentives on private reforestation in tropical Australia. Börner and Wunder (2008) 
discussed paying for avoided deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, whereas Pfaff et al. 
(2007) empirically studied the conservation of tropical forests for carbon benefits from the 
Costa Rican perspective. Apart from these, a number of studies (e.g. Bulter et al. 2009, 
Naidoo et al. 2009, Persson and Azar 2010) discussed the role of carbon payment in 
combating tropical deforestation.  None of the studies discussed in this section (2.2.3) have, 
however, included any taxes. Likewise, the taxation literature reviewed in the last two 
sections and in Table 1 has ignored the climate policy instruments.  Article (III) of this 
thesis analyzes the joint impacts of taxes and carbon-based instruments on tropical forest 
clearing and land price in a market equilibrium framework. 
 
 
2.2.4 Optimal design of taxes and carbon-based policy instruments for forests 
The design of optimal forest taxation in the presence of amenity valuation and bequest 
motive was discussed, for example, in Amacher and Brazee (1997) and Amacher et al. 
(2002).  A small number of studies also investigated the design of optimal carbon incentive 
programs for forests. Tahvonen (1995) and Romero et al. (1998) presented comprehensive 
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approaches to calculate the rate of carbon subsidy/tax needed to ensure the social optima of 
forests. Englin and Klan (1990) and Koskela and Ollikainen (1997, 2003) examined the 
optimal mix of forest taxes to correct the negative externalities to society caused by 
harvesting and hence to equate the private optima with the social optima. However, these 
studies did not explicitly focus on tropical forests. Moreover, these studies did not discuss 
the design of a carbon policy instruments by taking into account any pre-existing taxation 
policies that focus, for example, on income from tropical forestland, as done in article (IV). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Studies that reviewed earlier taxation literature and investigated the effects of forest taxation 
without considering amenity valuation 
 
Study Modeling framework  Topic 
Literature review or general studies 
Amacher (1997) ----- Review of forest taxation literature 
Karsenty (2010) ----- Forest taxation that focuses on tropical forests 
in Central Africa 
Ruzicka (2010) ----- Forest taxation from tropical forest point of 
view 
Studies without  considering amenity valuation 
Klemperer (1976) Optimal rotation Tax effects on optimal rotation length 
Klemperer (1978) Optimal rotation Timber tax equity criteria in setting forest 
property tax levels 
Chang (1982) Optimal rotation Taxation effect on optimal forest rotation 
Chang (1983) Optimal rotation Taxation effect on optimal forest rotation 
Kovenock (1986) Optimal rotation Effect of land value and income taxation in an 
Austrian sector of economy  
Koskela (1989a) Two-period Tax effects on timber supply under timber 
price uncertainty 
Koskela (1989b) Two-period Tax effects on timber supply under price 
uncertainty and credit rationing  
Ollikainen (1990) Two-period  Forest taxation effect on timber supply under 
interest rate uncertainty and perfect or credit 
rationed capital market 
Olllikainen (1991) Two-period Effects of taxes that target non-forest assets 
on timber supply under timber price 
uncertainty 
Ovaskainen (1992) Two-period Forest taxation effect on timber supply and 
forest management intensity 
Ollikainen (1993) Two-period Forest taxation and timber supply under 
interest rate and future timber price uncertainty 
Ollikainen (1996) Two-period Forest taxation effects on timber supply under 
endogenous credit rationing 
Uusivuori (2000) Multi-period utility 
maximization 
Neutrality of income taxation in an Austrian 
sector economy 
Conrad et al. (2005) Multi-period dynamic Tax effects on tropical forest harvesting 
Namaalwa et al. 
(2007)  
Dynamic bio-economic Impacts of taxes imposed on forestry income 
on the level of forest resources utilization in 
Uganda 
Alvarez and Koskela 
(2007) 
Optimal rotation Effects of forest taxes on optimal rotation 
under stochastic stand value and risk aversion 
or neutrality 
Anthon et al. (2008) Single-period utility 
maximization 
The impacts of taxes imposed on forestry 
income on the level of forest resources 
utilization in Tanzania. 
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3. METHODOLOGIES AND RESULTS OF SEPARATE ARTICLES 
 
3.1 Amenity preference and taxation on non-industrial private forest-owners  
In article (I) a utility-maximizing forestland model of a forest-owner with amenity 
preference is used. The model includes profit and land value taxes, and incorporates two 
different forest harvesting decisions into the two-period framework. The harvesting 
decisions are made sequentially in such a way that, first, the forest-owner decides how 
much of his forest area to clear and second, how much of the remaining standing volume to 
thin. In contrast to the two-period biomass harvesting models which were used in earlier 
forest economics literature (e.g. Kuuluvainen 1989, Koskela 1989a, b, Ollikainen 1990, 
1991, 1993, 1996, Ovaskainen 1992, Kuuluvainen et al. 1996) article (I) identifies clear-
cutting and thinning harvest explicitly. The new growth on cleared land is an opportunity 
cost of not clear-cutting in the first period, and thus it can be considered to represent land 
costs (as discussed in Section 2.1.1). By considering the new growth, the model also 
describes a forest in the second period with two age-classes.  In addition, in this model a 
solution where the old-growth is only thinned is possible. The forest growth described in 
the model consists of an age-class dependent, constant intrinsic growth, and induced growth. 
The induced growth is concave, and depends on thinning intensity.   
The comparative statics effects of taxes on both harvesting types are derived following 
Varian (1992, p. 491-492).  The analytical comparative statics results give the qualitative 
effects of taxes on clear-cutting and thinning harvests under the amenity preference of the 
forest-owner.  By using the case of a typical NIPF owner in Finland, the numerical analysis 
showed how these tax effects vary at different intensities of amenity preference of the 
forest-owners. 
The numerical results show that both with no or very small intensity of amenity 
preference and with exclusive intensity of amenity preference, the NIPF owners behave 
similarly with or without the profit and land value taxes, i.e. the taxes are neutral to both 
clear-cutting and thinning decisions. Consequently the taxes do not influence the harvesting 
decisionmaking of those NIPF owners who are biased toward either timber harvesting or 
the amenity values of forests. Under small to medium intensities of amenity preference, i.e. 
when the forest-owner is relatively balanced between timber and amenity objectives, the 
profit tax decreases the optimal clear-cutting volumes. However, the effect on thinning may 
be positive or negative, depending on the level of intensity of amenity preference. The net 
effect of the profit tax is negative on the short-run timber supply of forest-owners who are 
relatively balanced between timber and forest amenities. The effects of the land value tax 
on clear-cutting and thinning harvests for the same forest-owners’ group are opposite to the 
corresponding effects of the profit tax. These all imply that the taxes affect only those NIPF 
owners who are relatively balanced between timber production objectives and amenity 
benefits. In addition, it is shown analytically that the popularity of thinning increases over 
that of clear-cutting with the increase of the intensity of amenity preference to a point at 
which the forest-owner ceases clear-cutting and substitutes thinning for it.  
The numerical analysis in article (I) demonstrates that a voluntary tax regime with a 
lowered profit tax combined with a land value tax may bring Pareto-improvement to a 
regime with profit tax but without a land value tax. In the proposed tax regime, under a 
certain range of intensities of amenity preference, a government can increase its tax revenue 
collection while the NIPF owners can have increased utility contrast to the current regime. 
This indicates that whether the win-win situation arises, crucially depends on the 
distribution of amenity intensity among the NIPF owners. The analysis also shows that the 
23 
 
range of intensities of amenity preference that gives rise to the win-win situation changes 
its location and size as the timber price changes. This highlights the importance of 
considering both the amenity preference intensities and the fluctuation in timber prices to 
identify which party gains and which party loses when planning possible tax regime 
changes. 
 
3.2 Taxation, life-time uncertainty and nonindustrial private forest-owner’s decision 
making  
Article (II) uses a two-period utility maximizing forestland model of a forest-owner with 
amenity preferences, focusing on clear-cutting only. The model incorporates capital income 
and inheritance taxes on forest and non-forest assets. Moreover, as a new feature in forest 
economics literature, the forest-owner’s perceived probability of surviving through a future 
period is included in the model. The decreasing probability of survival in the model is a 
proxy for forest-owner’s ageing. The higher is the survival probability, the younger is the 
forest-owner, and the lower is the survival probability, the older is the forest-owner. 
Therefore, the survival probability allows the analysis of the effect of forest-owner’s age on 
consumption and harvesting, in addition to the effects of taxes among different age groups 
of forest-owners. Moreover, besides the consumption and the amenity services of the forest, 
utility is derived from the bequest. In the first period the forest-owner perceives the 
possibilities of both consuming and bequeathing to the next generation, both of which are 
conditional on his survival probability. The model is structured in such a way that it lets the 
forest-owner bequeath all his assets that are left at the time he passes away, instead of a 
priori deciding on the level of bequests.  This structure circumvents the conceptual question 
of what happens, at the occurrence of passing away, to those assets that were not planned to 
be bequeathed. That particular question was left unanswered in the models used in the 
earlier literature (e.g. Ollikainen 1998, Amacher et al. 1999) that formulated a specific 
decision defining the size of inheritance.  
The comparative statics analysis is carried out to examine analytically the effects of 
ageing on consumption and harvesting, and also the effects of taxes on harvesting. The 
substitution and income effects of ageing and taxes are derived using the Slutsky 
decomposition. The numerical analysis demonstrates how consumption changes in the 
presence of taxes and how the effects of four taxes on harvesting vary among different age 
groups of forest-owners.  
The results of article (II) indicate that the optimal consumption is linked to both 
taxation and the forest-owner's age. The effects of taxes are studied when taxation takes 
place both through consumption and through bequests. Consumption first decreases and 
then increases when moving from younger to older individuals regardless of whether non-
timber assets are more or less heavily taxed through bequests rather than consumption. The 
former case typically corresponds to a situation in which inheritance takes place between 
distant relatives, whereas the latter corresponds to a situation where inheritance takes place 
between close relatives. The results also show that the effects of each specific tax are 
generally dependent on the forest-owner’s age. Age tends to intensify the increasing effect 
on harvesting of the forest bequest tax. The same is true with respect to the decreasing 
effects on harvesting of the inheritance tax imposed on non-forest assets. Furthermore, the 
forest-owner's age tends to intensify the negative effect on harvesting of the capital income 
tax imposed on forest assets, but diminishes the negative effect on harvesting of the capital 
income tax imposed on non-forest assets. In this article the non-neutrality of the capital 
income tax on timber assets is linked to the perceived survival probability, and hence to the 
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forest owner’s age, rather than to the existence of inheritance taxes as in Amacher et al. 
(1999).  
The comparative statics results show that in the case of the capital income taxes on 
forest and non-forest assets and also the inheritance tax on non-forest assets, the 
substitution effect works towards decreasing harvesting levels, whereas the income effect is 
ambiguous. The negative substitution effect always dominates in the numerical examples.  
 
3.3 Impacts of carbon-based policy instruments and taxes on tropical deforestation  
Article (III) uses a market equilibrium framework to investigate the demand for and supply 
of cleared tropical forestland, and to analyze the effects of carbon payments and taxes 
imposed on forestry and cash-crop sectors in combating tropical deforestation. The supply 
of cleared forest land is derived by using a two-period utility maximization model in which 
the carbon sequestration of private forestland holders is credited. Demand for cleared land 
is derived from the profit maximization model of a cash-crop farmer. On the supply side, 
the private forestland holders value forest amenities, but less than what is globally a desired 
level, because they do not fully value the global public goods. The supply side model treats 
the forests as a non-renewable resource. This enables one to capture the reality of tropics 
where tropical forest clearing is often more than a one-way traffic; once tropical forest is 
cleared, the cleared land ends up in other uses such as cash-crops. The model considers 
carbon payments under two systems where carbon-credited land can either be redeemed or 
not. The demand-side model includes a Cobb-Douglas-type production technology for 
cash-crop with three inputs: land, labor and an aggregate input composed of all material 
inputs apart from land and labor. The numerical analysis of the market equilibrium uses 
data from the humid Chaco eco-region of Paraguay, which is an important biodiversity 
region in South America.  
The results of article (III) indicate that taxes on cash-crop and forestry incomes in fact 
can be an ineffective measure in curbing tropical forest clearing. On the other hand, the 
carbon payment would make the private forestland holder value the standing forests more 
and hence clear less forest. It is shown that in the context of the humid Chaco eco-region of 
Paraguay, at €30 per ton of carbon, the deforestation would be restricted to 10 percent of 
existing forest cover. The carbon payments would also incentivize the private forestland 
holder to be more responsive to land prices when making clearing decision. This, in turn, 
would increase the land price in cash-crop. A reversible carbon crediting system, where a 
forestland holder can redeem the credited forest from conservation to timber production, 
seems to substantially increase the effectiveness of carbon payments in the short run. The 
carbon payments could also complement the tax on cash-crop incomes in curbing tropical 
forest loss. Therefore, an effective policy to combat tropical deforestation should consider 
forestry and cash-crop sectors together. It is also shown that to bring 25 percent of the 
privately held forest under conservation in humid Chaco region of Paraguay, no taxes or 
carbon payments are needed. To conserve any share of forest exceeding 25 percent but less 
than or equal to 66 percent, a constant carbon payment of just over €25/tC is needed. To 
conserve beyond 66 percent, the required carbon payment rate increases with the increase 
of conservation share. As the conservation share grows, the market equilibrium land price 
increases, thus making it less attractive to cash-crop farmers. The required carbon payment 
rate is, however, very minimally affected by the presence of a forestry income tax.  
25 
 
3.4 On the economics of tropical deforestation: carbon credit markets and national 
policies  
Article (IV) uses an infinite time horizon dynamic optimization model to study the 
economics of tropical deforestation under a carbon compensation scheme. Earlier analytical 
models investigating tropical deforestation (e.g. Walker and Smith 1993, Bulte and van 
Soest 1996, and Mateo 1997 Mendelsohn 1994, Amacher et al. 2009, Barbier et al. 2005, 
Hartwick et al. 2001), did not consider a carbon compensation scheme. The carbon 
compensation scheme provides the forestland owners with an alternative to deforestation: 
they can sell the forests on the international carbon credit markets. The model treats the 
tropical forests as a non-renewable resource, and combines forest amenity valuation into the 
decision framework with regards to non-renewable resources.  The deforestation behavior 
of both private and public sectors are modeled.  Both sectors maximize utility from 
consumption in addition to forest amenities over an infinite time horizon. The private agent 
is assumed to have a smaller weight on the amenity preferences compared to the social 
planner. The justification for this is that the social planner includes in his decision the 
amenity benefits accruing to a wider group of people than does the private agent. For 
example, deforestation within a community area may have adverse impacts on the farming 
conditions of a neighboring community, which are typically ignored by the private agents. 
Table 2 summarizes the methodologies used in article (IV) and other three articles of this 
thesis.  
The model highlights the fact that carbon compensations would increase the value of a 
standing forest. The results suggest that the rate of land income tax needed to enforce a 
socially optimal tropical forest stock should equal the proportional difference between the 
social and private amenity valuations of tropical forests. The carbon compensation policy 
crucially depends on pre-existing land income taxation policy. The existence of such a 
taxation policy may require the government to pass the same rate of carbon compensation 
that it received from the international community to private forestland owners to ensure 
socially optimal tropical forest stock. Under a pre-existing sub-optimal land income 
taxation policy, it may be optimal for the government to either over-transfer or under-
transfer the carbon compensation depending on the level of forest amenity valuation of 
private landowners. In the complete absence of a taxation policy, the government may 
always require to over-transfer the carbon compensation to the landowner. The results 
imply that an effective carbon compensation scheme such as under the REDD framework 
should take into consideration existing national policies such as the land income taxation 
that affects deforestation. 
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Table 2: Methodologies used in separate articles 
 
Article Model 
category 
Forest amenity 
valuation with 
Endogenous 
variable(s) 
Analytical 
analysis 
Numerical analysis 
Data source Program used 
I Two-period  
forestland 
 
Amenity utility & 
intensity 
Net saving, clear-cutting 
and thinning shares 
Comparative 
statics  
A representative Finnish 
NIPF owner’s case 
MATLAB 
II Two-period 
forestland 
 
Amenity utility & 
intensity 
Net saving, and clear-
cutting share 
Comparative 
statics 
A representative Finnish 
NIPF owner’s case 
MATLAB 
 
 
III 
Two-period 
 
 
Amenity utility but no 
amenity intensity 
 
Forest clearing and 
carbon crediting shares, 
and current consumption 
 
Optimal 
conditions, and 
land supply 
function 
A representative private 
forestland holder’s case in 
humid Chaco of Paraguay 
 
 
 
 
MATLAB Cobb-Douglas-
type 
No amenity valuation Cleared land and other 
input demands 
Land demand 
function and 
market equilibrium 
A hypothetical soy plantation 
case in  humid Chaco eco-
region of Paraguay 
IV Infinite horizon 
dynamic 
optimization 
Amenity utility but no 
amenity intensity 
 
Forest clearing and 
carbon crediting shares, 
and consumption 
in each period 
Optimal conditions 
and policy rules 
Numerical analysis not conducted 
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4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
4.1 Taxation effects, amenity preference and ageing of forest-owners 
Article (I) of this thesis offers a number of important insights regarding the behavior of 
different groups of forest-owners that are separated by their preferences for forest 
amenities. The results indicate that profit tax and the land value tax affect the harvesting 
decisions of only those forest-owners whose preferences are relatively balanced between 
timber production and amenity values. These taxes are neutral to the harvesting decisions of 
the forest-owners who are relatively biased toward either timber production or amenity 
values of forest. This implies that forest-owners amenity values do not necessarily make the 
forest taxes non-neutral to the harvesting decisions of private forest-owners. It is rather the 
intensities of the preferences for forest amenities of the forest-owners that affect the non-
neutrality of forest taxes concerning forest harvesting.  Earlier studies (see Section 2.2.1) 
have only investigated the non-neutrality of certain forest taxes in the presence of the forest 
amenity valuation, without addressing the issue of how the forest taxation effects vary at 
different intensities of preferences of forest amenity values of the forest-owners.  
The intensity of amenity preferences of the forest-owners is a key factor in 
determining whether or not a tax regime with a lowered profit tax and a land value tax 
brings Pareto-improvement to a regime with a higher profit tax but no land value tax. 
Furthermore, according to the results of article (I), the popularity of thinning to replace 
clear-cutting increases as the intensity of preferences for forest amenities produced by 
standing forest increases. This implies that thinning may be the preferred method of forest 
harvesting over clear-cutting in mature forests among those forest-owners who are 
relatively biased toward forest amenities values.  
In article (II), the age of forest-owners affects their decisions between consumption 
and leaving bequests irrespective of taxes present. This implies that forest-owners’ ageing 
is important in determining how taxes affect forest-owners’ consumption and bequest 
decisionmaking. Earlier forest economics literature (see Section 2.2.2) had not discussed 
the issue of consumption and bequests in relation to forest-owners’ ageing. The non-
neutrality concerning forest harvesting in response to the capital income tax imposed on 
forest assets (which is equivalent to profit tax) also depends on forest-owner’s age. 
Furthermore, article (II) shows that forest-owner’s age intensifies the positive effect on 
harvesting of the inheritance tax on forest assets and the negative effects on harvesting of 
the capital income tax on forest assets and inheritance tax on non-forest assets, but age 
diminishes the negative effect on harvesting of capital income tax on non-forest assets.  
 
4.2 Taxation effects and policy instruments that target climate services from forests 
Article (III) shows that income taxes on forestry and cash-crops, on their own, may be 
ineffective in curbing tropical forest loss, whereas the carbon payments may be effective. A 
reason for the ineffectiveness of taxes could be that they target tropical forest loss only 
indirectly. Carbon payments complement taxes on forestry and cash-crop incomes in 
curbing tropical forest loss. This finding provides evidence in favor of the argument made 
by Karsenty (2010) that taxes alone may not be enough to ensure sustainable tropical forest 
management; instead they should be used as a component of a consistent set of actions and 
public policies for the best effect. Article (III) estimates the carbon payment rate needed to 
avoid forest loss in the humid Chaco eco-region of Paraguay (e.g. €30 per ton of carbon 
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emission avoided would be sufficient to limit deforestation to 10 percent of existing forest 
cover in the area). Moreover, to bring 25 percent privately held tropical forest under 
conservation, no taxes or carbon payments are needed. This share coincides with 
Paraguayan regulations that require private forestland holders to retain 25 percent of their 
forest while clearing forests. To conserve any share of forest more than 25 percent but less 
than or equal to 66 percent, a constant carbon payment of just over €25/tC is needed. This is 
because at a carbon payment rate of  €25/tC or, it is not optimal for the private landholder 
to participate the carbon crediting scheme, but once the rate just exceeds €25/tC, he finds it 
optimal to conserve maximum of 66 percent of his forest. To bring more than 66 percent 
forest under conservation, higher carbon payment rates are required as the conservation 
share grows. Moreover, the required rate of payment is affected only minimally by the 
presence of a forest income tax. The increasing trend of carbon payment rate may be linked 
to the fact that the opportunity costs of clearing forests increase as the conservation share 
grows (see also Kindermann 2008).  
Article (IV) demonstrates the dependency of optimal carbon compensation policies of 
a national government on existing land income taxation. How much carbon compensation is 
optimal for a national government to pass onto forest-owners depends upon whether or not 
land income taxation exists in that particular country and, if so, on whether or not that 
taxation is optimally set.  The joint effects of carbon compensation and taxation systems 
may make it optimal for a national government to use different carbon compensation rates 
than the standard rate it received from the international community when passing on 
compensations at local levels. Article (IV) also shows that the necessity of land income 
taxation to bring the private optimal level of tropical forest resource to social optimal level 
depends upon the levels of forest amenity valuations of the private and public sectors.  As 
long as they differ, a tax is needed, but no tax is needed when they are identical. This 
suggests that the land income tax has effects similar to Pigouvian type of taxes. 
 
4.3 Policy implications and conclusions 
The results of the four articles included in this thesis have a number of policy implications. 
The interlinkages between forest tax effects and the intensity of forest amenity preferences 
(article I) suggest that forest-owners' general attitudes and objectives with respect to their 
forest ownership will have an impact on the effectiveness of forest taxation policies. For 
example, clear-cutting may be reduced whereas thinning harvests may increase as a result 
of tax policy measures. Since the effectiveness of tax policies depends upon the actual 
intensity and distribution of the amenity preferences among forest-owners, it might serve as 
an incentive to implement a tax regime that recognizes this. In one such regime forest-
owners could voluntarily opt for a combination of an estate type of tax and timber sales tax, 
as an alternative to a sole timber sales tax. Forest-owners’ amenity preferences would be an 
important factor in determining their choice between the tax regimes. The discussion 
indicates the importance of developing methods to measure forest-owners’ amenity 
preferences quantitatively. Experimental or contingency methods could be used for such 
measurement. Investing in this line of research would help policy makers formulate more 
efficient policies for nonindustrial private forest-owners. 
The dependency of the effects of capital income and inheritance taxes on forest-
owner’s ageing (article II) suggests that the design of taxation that targets the actors in the 
forestry sector should take into consideration the demographic profile of forest-owners and 
the likely development of this profile. The age-distribution of non-industrial private forest-
owners in many countries is skewed towards the older generations, whose reactions to 
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capital income and inheritance taxes may be fundamentally different from those of younger 
generations. The finding in article (II) that ageing affects the level of harvests of mature 
forest substantially implies that changes in the age-distribution of the forest-owners can 
affect the wealth distribution between forest and non-forest assets in society. On the other 
hand, as the inheritance tax on timber assets increases the current harvesting, it could 
effectively be used as a policy tool to ensure an increased timber supply in the short run. 
In addition, the findings of articles (I & II) have implications from the point of view 
of achieving public policy goals concerning forest conservation in mitigating climate 
change. The results of article (I) indicate that when forest-owners have more balanced 
objectives between timber and forest amenities, the profit taxation works better in reducing 
harvest, which may lead to achieving more climate goals through forest conservation. 
Likewise, a general implication of the results of articles (I & II) is that taxation that targets 
the forestry sector should also be designed with a view to its links to the forest-owners' 
amenity preferences and its consequences for forest conservation. Moreover, as shown in 
article (II) both the capital income taxes and the inheritance tax on external assets work 
toward tying up more capital in the standing timber stock by decreasing the current 
harvesting. Consequently more timber is conserved voluntarily by the landowners 
compared with a case where these taxes on external assets are not in existence. Due to the 
presence of theses taxes, implementing forest conservation policies on private land and 
achieving targets, such as carbon sequestration, nature-based recreation, securing more old 
growth structure etc. may thus become less costly for governments. Moreover, a finding of 
the article (I) is that as the forest-owners become more biased toward amenity values of 
forests, thinning becomes more desirable over clear-cutting as the harvesting method. If this 
development takes place, it may lead to a shift toward continuous cover-type forestry and 
may thus ensure more biodiversity, carbon sequestration and environmental services from 
private forests. 
According to article (III), the complementarity between the carbon payment and the 
tax measures in curbing deforestation suggests that the effective policies should target 
forestry and agricultural sectors in combination and policies for these sectors should be 
coordinated. The effectiveness of carbon-based policy instruments in combating tropical 
deforestation largely depends on the way avoided deforestation is compensated in the future, 
for example, under REDD regimes. Therefore, the value of tropical forests should be 
carefully considered when formulating policies. Moreover, as suggested in article (III) the 
carbon-based policy instruments such as carbon payments may lead to reducing tropical 
forest clearing. This may have two contrasting policy implications. First, if the development 
of policy that regulates climate services from forest sector is not uniform throughout a 
region or the world, the strict enforcement of such a policy in one country or region may 
lead to leakage, i.e. transferring forest loss to other countries or regions in which effective 
policies to protect tropical forest from being cleared do not exist or are not enforced strictly. 
Second, if the policy development is relatively uniform throughout a region, it may push 
plantation investment and development, and efficient use of wasteland to satisfy the 
increased timber and fiber demands. A uniform development of policy that regulates 
climate services from forests may also call for further technological innovation to enhance 
cash-crop or agricultural productivity as no more land from forest clearing would be 
allocated to cash-crop or agriculture. 
In article (IV) it is shown that the carbon compensation policies of government of a 
tropical forest owning country crucially depend on pre-existing land income taxation in that 
country. The joint effect of the carbon compensation and land income taxation suggests that 
rather than using the compensation rate set by international community, it would be optimal 
for each national government to use its own set of flexible rates when compensating local 
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forestland owners for not clearing forests. Therefore, a carbon compensation policy for 
saving tropical forests should take into account existing national policies such as taxation 
that affects deforestation.  A more general implication of the results of article (IV) is that 
the carbon compensation scheme studied could be one possible way to set up international 
compensatory policies between developed and less developed countries as hypothesized in 
the REDD initiative of the UNFCC.  
Based on the above discussion it can be concluded that agent specific factors such as 
ageing and individual amenity preferences should be considered in designing forest taxation 
policy. Moreover, existing policies such as land income taxation should be considered in 
designing carbon-based policy instruments to enhance the role of forests in climate change 
mitigation.  
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